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W O J C I E C H  S Z Y M A Ń S K I
Being with Oneself / Being with You: 
Friendship and Art Criঞ cism
Es ergo sum: C/M – Chopin and Montaigne
On Wednesday, 22 September 1830, Frédéric Chopin wrote from Warsaw
to his friend Tytus Woyciechowski:
[…] if not for the fact that you are far away, somewhere past Hrubieszów, 
I would have asked you to come […] and bring solace to your fellow men, even 
if you hated them. If only I could console you somehow, I would, but believe 
me, there is no cure for this pain […]. You live, you feel, and you are lived and 
felt by others, so you are a happy-unhappy man. I understand you well, for I see 
through your soul, and… let us embrace, for there is no need to speak further. 
(Chopin 2009: 406)
Th e excerpt quoted above is not only a testament to the deep friendship 
between twenty-year-old Chopin and almost twenty-two-year-old Woy-
ciechowski, but also, as it is claimed by Ryszard Przybylski in his book 
Cień jaskółki: Esej o myślach Chopina [A Shadow of the Swallow: An Essay 
on Chopin’s Th oughts], it refl ects the Romantic concept of existence, in 
which another person becomes one’s life (Przybylski 2009: 45).
Indeed, both the excerpt and Chopin’s opening address to Woyciechowski 
“My dearest life!” (Chopin 2009: 402) give full expression to the Roman-
tic feeling. Th e idea is closely related to Novalis’s Lebensreligion with its 
possibly most famous quote “I am You” (Novalis 1997: 173) and its late 
Romantic travesty by Arthur Rimbaud in yet another letter – one writ-
ten to Paul Demeny in May 1971: “Je est un autre,” [I is another] ([in:] 
Sorrell 2001: xvii).
Th is Romantic understanding of human existence stems directly from 
the contemporary understanding of love and friendship. According to 
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Przybylski, “the full identifi cation of ‘I’ with the Other, enabled by love 
and friendship in the Romantic period, […] was not limited to the in-
stances where one soul absorbs another. […] Th e Other may not only fi ll 
[…] one’s soul, it may also become one’s life” (Przybylski 2009: 45). And 
not only that: “Romantic friendship was founded on the belief that the 
existence of ‘you’ is a presupposed reality” (31). Th rough the very fact 
that “you” in the Romantic period – owing to no one else but Novalis1
– acquired the primary status, “the Romantics managed to transcend the 
loneliness inscribed in the Cartesian cogito” (ibid.).
Escaping the constraints of the tragic loneliness of a thinking subject, 
so characteristic of the modern period dating from the publication of 
Descartes’s Discourse on the Method, implies not only the transformation 
of the famous maxim cogito ergo sum into es ergo sum, but also the dis-
covery of a new ontology and anthropology. Indeed, in his letter to Woy-
ciechowski, Chopin seems to be uncovering the very secret of existence. 
In his view, existence is not rooted in the adventures of a single, inde-
pendently thinking “I,” but rather depends on sharing one’s life and sen-
timents with another.
Th is is refl ected in the passage in which the composer uses intransitive 
Polish verbs “to live” and “to feel” in the passive voice, and where the 
relationship that emerges through friendship is referred to as a state 
in which one is “lived” and “felt.” Przybylski, who off ers an illuminating 
commentary on this “violation of language” by Chopin (Przybylski 2009: 
32), explains this as follows: “You live and you feel, so you are an agent. 
You are ‘lived’ and ‘felt’ by others, which makes you a patient. And you 
live truly only when you know that you are living for yourself and for 
another. […] In that sense, for Chopin existence always implied living 
for another person” (33). Th is concept of human existence, fully attained 
through friendship, off ers an escape from the despair that is fundamental 
to life: “Because you live and feel, you must be unhappy. Existence then 
entails unhappiness. But through being ‘lived’ and ‘felt’ by another, you 
can escape this dreadful condition. Not simply because you are lived and 
felt by others, but because you become someone’s feeling and life” (34).
Friendship as the passive side of existence – as it is, I believe, portrayed 
in Chopin’s correspondence – was a truly Romantic concept, perfectly re-
fl ecting the sensibilities of the period. Still, it was by no means a Romantic 
invention. In 1580, that is fi fty years before Descartes’s Discourse on the 
¹ Novalis borrowed Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s concept of the Not-I (Nicht-Ich) as the 
foundation of all philosophy, and in his religion of love he replaced it with “You” (Du).
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Method was published in Leiden, Michel de Montaigne wrote his famous 
Essays, which infl uenced Francis Bacon’s Essays published sixteen years 
later (1596). Th ese two pre-Cartesian texts deserve to be mentioned here, 
for two important reasons. Firstly, both Montaigne and Bacon included 
in their works essays devoted to the subject of friendship; secondly, and 
more signifi cantly perhaps, these are essays whose logic is governed not 
by the lonely principle of cogito, ready to enthral the European imagina-
tion in the following century, but rather the double, and always incom-
plete when single, existence embraced by the Romantics.
In his essay on friendship, Montaigne describes his own relationship 
with the writer and philosopher Étienne de la Boétie. Interestingly, his 
description of that bond is very close to what the great Romantic com-
poser wrote two hundred and fi fty years later. Michel de Montaigne dis-
tinguishes between two types of friendship, i.e. between the “common” 
and the “true” kind: 
For the rest, what we ordinarily call friends and friendships are nothing but
acquaintanceships and familiarities formed by some chance or convenience, 
by means of which our souls are bound to each other. In the friendship I speak 
of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they eff ace 
the seam that joined them, and cannot fi nd it again. If you press me to tell why 
I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because 
it was he, because it was I. (de Montaigne 1958: 139)
Th e seam that Montaigne comments upon, creating a metaphor of 
friendship in the process – a healing of a wound or sewing together two 
pieces of skin – is equally strong as the one imagined by the Romantics.
Later in the essay, de Montaigne relates the beginnings of his 
friendship with de la Boetié: “it is I know not what quintessence of all 
this mixture, which, having seized my whole will, led it to plunge and lose 
itself in mine, with equal hunger, equal rivalry. I say lose, in truth, for 
neither of us reserved anything for himself, nor was anything either his
or mine” (ibid.). Th en, adding a defi nition of “true” friendship, the father 
of essay writing anticipates both Novalis and Rimbaud in stating that:
“A single dominant friendship dissolves all other obligations. Th e secret 
I have sworn to reveal to no other man, I can impart without perjury to 
the one who is not another man: he is myself. It is a great enough miracle 
to be doubled […]” (142).
Th is miracle of “being doubled” that occurs in the course of true friend-
ship conditions an existence that is built on two entities and focused on 
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the relation between them instead of being solitary and monadic.2 Th e 
“double state” allows one to fully experience one’s existence or, as Chopin 
declares in his letter, to alleviate its pains, but also, as Francis Bacon sug-
gests, it has real pragmatic value, according to the saying that two heads 
are better than one. For a friend is more than just another instance of 
myself, an alter ego: “it will appear that it was a sparing speech of the an-
cients to say, that a friend is another himself, for that a friend is far more 
than himself […] so that a man hath, as it were, two lives in his desires. 
A man hath a body, and that body is confi ned to a place; but where friend-
ship is, all offi  ces of life are, as it were, granted to him and his deputy […]. 
How many things are there which a man cannot, with any face or comeli-
ness say or do himself! […] [B]ut all these things are graceful in a friend’s 
mouth which are blushing in a man’s own” (Bacon 2008: 86). A friend
appears thus a prosopopoeic character who speaks for me whenever my 
own mouth is tied, and when he acts, it is as if I were acting through him, 
because he speaks just like I would myself.
My aim here is to extrapolate these pre-(Renaissance) and post-
-Cartesian (Romantic) refl ections on the nature of friendship to a fi eld 
which, I  believe, must be close both to Chopin as a  composer and
de Montaigne as a writer (both of them being hommes de lettres), and en-
gage in a more pragmatic discussion of the reception of various artistic 
activities (prose, music, fi ne arts) in art criticism.
Art Criঞ cism and Friendship:
Why Would an Arঞ st Need a Friend?
Th e Romantic and early modern understanding of friendship, as it emerged 
from Chopin’s letters and Bacon’s and Michel de Montaigne’s essays, as well 
as the characteristic concepts of transferability (Chopin), double identity 
(de Montaigne) and prosopopoeia (Bacon) can well be found among the key 
elements of the modern and modernist art criticism. Th is mode of critical 
² This relational understanding of existence, finding its expression in Michel de 
Montaigne’s and Chopin’s visions of friendship, is reminiscent of the defi nition of 
identity found in the late writings of Martin Heidegger. According to the German 
philosopher, even though the common understanding of identity is A = A, and so 
fi xed identity seems to require one entity only, “Th e formula A = A speaks of equality. 
It doesn’t defi ne A as the same” (Heidegger 2002: 24) and “Th e formula expresses the 
equality of A and A. An equation requires at least two elements. One A is equal to
another” (23).
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writing was described in 1971 by Mieczysław Porębski, one of Poland’s 
leading art historians and critics of the past century and a close friend of 
Tadeusz Kantor. Porębski believed art criticism founded on friendship to 
be outdated and disgraced. He labelled it as the “criticism of poets” and de-
scribed it in the following manner: “In the 19th-century culture, which was 
a literary culture par excellance, the critical choice was usually made based 
on the printed word […]. Art criticism usually models itself on literary criti-
cism, which is best grounded in this paradigm. And so, following in the 
footsteps of philosophers, aestheticists and journalists, poets and writers 
increasingly often express their opinions” (Porębski 1983: 156). Signifi -
cantly for the present discussion, these were the poets “who brought the 
disputes and discussions to boiling temperature through taking the side of 
artists who were emotionally and socially close to them [my emphasis – W.S.] 
against politicians, moralists and erudites who until recently had held the 
reins of modernity in that bookish society” (ibid.).
According to Porębski, the roots of this particular mode of art criti-
cism, and the emergence of critics “emotionally close to artists and op-
posed to politicians” lie in the Romantic period, in the times of Chopin: 
“tracing the ancestry of this kind of criticism one might go back as far 
as […] to the Romantic age” (ibid.).3 Th e crucial aspect of this relation-
ship is the kind of a prosopopoeic alliance emerging between a painter 
and a poet. In Porębski’s words, “What is new, unorthodox and noncon-
formist is often supported by the poète maudit, the accursed poet, who
sees his natural partner in the accursed painter (peintre maudit). He
sustains this bond not through his knowledge or expertise but rather
through personal things – acts of friendship, free expression of his belief
in their path and the game in which they both participate” (ibid.).
Th is “poets’ criticism” – based on friendship, fl ourishing in literary 
cafés, French-speaking and modelled on the Parisian society – was,
according to Porębski, characteristic of the modernist period and still 
noticeable throughout the fi rst half of the 20th century. It peaked before 
the First World War, fi nding its emblematic expression in Pablo Picasso’s
relationship with Max Jacob first, and later also André Salmon and
Guillaume Apollinaire.
³ Th e legendary romantic performance that may be regarded as the beginning of the 
model of art criticism as described by Porębski is the world premiere of Victor Hugo’s 
Hernani in Paris in February 1830 – only a few months before Chopin wrote his letter. 
Th e premiere, its surrounding atmosphere of artistic ferment and its critical reception 
were described by a contemporary author, Th éophile Gautier (Gautier 1874: 99–114).
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Th is high point of “poets’ criticism” based on friendship is described in 
detail by Gertrude Stein, who in 1938 wrote in her own essay about her 
friend Picasso: “His friends in Paris were writers rather than painters;
why have painters for friends when he could paint as he could paint. 
It was obvious that he did not need to have painters in his daily life and 
this was true all his life” (Stein 1984: 3). Interestingly, she seems to be 
ascribing to Picasso the type of friendship described by Bacon: the paint-
er befriends a poet who is also a critic, because he may not, cannot, or 
does not want to speak about his art in a way that a poet/critic may, can, 
or wants to do it. “Picasso who was a man who only expressed himself 
in painting had only writers as friends,” comments Stein, a writer and 
a friend of Picasso’s herself (4).
For a critic writing from the perspective of 1971, however, criticism 
founded on friendship seemed already archaic. Porębski believed that 
the poets’ criticism […], through its effi  ciency, dynamism and also beauty, cre-
ated norms that were soon adapted by those who lacked the powerful tool of 
poetic word mastered by their initiators. […] Currently, however, this kind 
of criticism, so often repetitive, verbose and devoid of all meaning, becomes 
not just superfl uous, but rather pathetic. Needless to say that today no one 
would look for […] information in any writings of such a poet or pseudo-poet. 
(Porębski 1983: 158)
According to the author, the fi nal decades of the 20th century, and per-
haps the following century as well, were to be dominated by a diff erent 
model, in which criticism would become a domain of experts. Th is was 
an entirely diff erent paradigm. While the previous model was dictated by 
the French culture, the new one was linked with the Anglo-Saxons. Th e 
criticism was to move from Parisian cafés to the new capital of arts: New 
York. But most importantly, friendship as the ground principle of poets’ 
criticism became completely indiff erent to the new criticism of experts, 
founded on impersonal professional relations instead of selfl ess and af-
fective friendship (158–159).
Th e abovementioned redefi nition and re-evaluation of art criticism
occurred in an interesting period. Porębski seems to have had the right
intuition concerning the ongoing changes in art criticism. Th e obvious
cultural breakthrough that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
marked a paradigm shift – from modernism and modernity to the post-
modern. Perhaps it can be claimed then that as the poets’ criticism was
essentially modernist, the new criticism advocated by Porębski was matched 
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to the demands of the postmodern era. Th is paradigm shift may, I believe, 
be treated as parallel to the change from the classicist Cartesian model to 
the Romantic, post-Cartesian one (to which Chopin clearly subscribed), 
and from the early-modern, Renaissance model to the Cartesian Enlight-
enment, towards the end of which Michel de Montaigne and Francis
Bacon wrote their texts. Signifi cantly, as I have tried to indicate, these 
paradigm shifts always entailed changes in the perception of friendship 
as a category of existence.
I would like to illustrate the shift from poets’ to experts’ critical model 
using the example of Eva Hesse – an artist who died in 1970, a year be-
fore Porębski’s text was published. Hesse was an essential fi gure for the 
transition in art that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which 
– to put it briefl y – meant not only surpassing the modernist paradigm 
by postmodernism in art theory and practice but also the shift from
modern to contemporary art, that is still valid today. Th e example of Eva 
Hesse shows also, I believe, the present tendency to turn away from the 
expert formula and look back – again – to the former model of friendship 
which characterised poets’ criticism.
Eva Hesse’s Friends
Eva Hesse’s Diaries, published in their complete form only in 2016, almost 
half a century after her death, off er – as diaries usually do – great insight 
into their author’s psyche. As far as Hesse’s friendships are concerned, an 
attentive reader will soon notice that if the artist ever had a true friend 
in her life, it was Eva Hesse herself. Th is stems from Hesse’s much-com-
mented-upon tendency to write about herself in the third person (McKin-
non 2010: 27–40), as if Eva Hesse was distancing herself from the “true” 
Eva and Eva the artist. Th at is why I propose to refer to Eva-the-diarist as 
the “writing Eva.” According to the Diaries, as the writing Eva recorded in 
1966, Eva had also another friend, someone called Rosie: “my friendship 
with Rosie. Our closeness + understanding of each other is remarkable 
and exists now since 1954” (Hesse 2016: 625). Still, she often felt pain-
fully alone. In 1964 she wrote in capital letters, as if crying out loud: “Sat. 
eve. Constant minor shocks upon arrival home. LONELINESS!” (294).
I did not read Diaries, however, to investigate Hesse’s “common” friend-
ships, to use Michel de Montaigne’s term. My intention was to discov-
er what the writing Eva has to say about the “true” friendship, as the 
author of Essays put it, namely her relationship with the art critic and 
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curator Lucy R. Lippard who discussed Hesse’s works from the perspec-
tive of their bond.
Lippard was one of the few infl uential fi gures of the American artistic 
world in the 1960s and 1970s who instantly recognised Hesse’s greatness. 
She was also the fi rst to off er an in-depth analysis of Hesse’s art. Her book 
entitled Eva Hesse was published in 1976, six years after Hesse’s untimely 
death, and from today’s perspective it remains the fundamental critical 
work marking the early reception of the artist’s output. Even though 
Diaries, penned by the “writing Eva” and concentrated on the “true Eva” and 
“Eva the artist,” do not off er much information regarding the relationship
of the two women,4 there can be no doubt that the perspective of female 
(!) friendship was essential to Lucy Lippard. Nevertheless, this frame 
of reference was immediately rejected by other specialists in the fi eld, 
confi rming Porębski’s intuition about the end of the paradigm of friendship 
in art criticism (formulated fi ve years before Lippard’s book).
Lucy Lippard expressed this allegedly outdated perspective, which she 
still wanted to adopt, up front, but also exposed its main weakness: 
I did not then, nor will I in this book, hesitate to “read into” Hesse’s work my 
knowledge of Hesse herself. She was a close friend for many years, and it would 
be a futile exercise, as well as something of a rejection, to attempt to ignore 
that knowledge. At the same time, it is clear that others, friends as well as those
who know only the work, whose subjective reactions to Hesse diff er from 
mine, will disagree. […] To make this book personal at all was a diffi  cult deci-
sion; since her death Hesse’s memory has been exploited even by those writ-
ers who purported to seriously discussing her art. In view of this, I began with 
a hyper-awareness that the only way to write about Hesse was to tread a fi ne 
and dangerous line between the art and the life – to emulate, in other words, 
the ‘edge’ she spoke of walking herself. (Lippard 1976a: 6)
Th is ambivalent perspective, full of traps and potential quagmires, is 
characteristic of Lippard’s narrative. Although the author recognises its 
fl aws, she also clearly perceives it as valuable and precious – this is espe-
cially well visible in the passage in which she comments on writings by 
4 Unfortunately, Hesse’s Diaries edited by Barry Rosen with the assistance of Tamara 
Bloomberg were published without any introduction, critical commentary or footnotes 
that would help to unambiguously identify a number of individuals that Hesse refers 
to (by means of their fi rst names only) in her life narrative. A critical edition of Hesse’s 
writing is yet to come.
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other critics, who do not know the artist personally and rely solely on 
published testimonies. As a result, the friendly tone of Lippard’s critical 
assessment, though questionable to a certain extent, becomes founded 
on a kind of a sisterly bond between the deceased artist and the living 
and writing critic. Signifi cantly, this personal, friendly and feminist per-
spective was something that Lippard had adapted before, as it allowed 
her to construe alternative narratives of the 1960s and 1970s art and
interpret that period outside of the dominant critical discourse. For these 
narratives, Eva Hesse remained an important reference. 
Suffi  ce it to mention eccentric abstraction – a term crucial today, but 
virtually nonexistent in the critical discourse of the fi nal three decades 
of the 20th century. Lippard used this phrase as the title of an exhibition 
she curated in 1966, in which Eva Hesse participated. Th e exhibition and 
its title were meant as a counterpoint to other, institutionalised forms 
of creating artistic canons; it was especially aimed against minimalism 
and its manifestation in the form of the famous 1966 exhibition titled 
Primary Structures in the Jewish Museum in New York (Szymański 2015: 
50–51). Another thing that comes to mind is the concept of demateri-
alisation, introduced by Lippard and John Chandler in 1968 as an alter-
native to conceptualism. Finally, I would like to mention Lippard’s book 
titled From the Center: Feminist Essays on Women’s Art (Lippard 1976b), 
published in the same year as her monograph on Eva Hesse. Th e volume, 
written from an openly feminist perspective, was a collection of essays 
devoted to female artists (including, of course, Eva Hesse). As the title 
suggests, even though Lippard’s refl ections are grounded in the concept of 
eccentric abstraction, she clearly relies on an extended understanding
of friendship, now replaced by the idea of sisterhood.
Lippard’s case renders at least two important moments that may shed 
light on the changing role of friendship in art criticism. First of all, the 
shift is visible in the eradication of concepts introduced by Lippard as 
well as the rejection of the friendly/sisterly perspective that she adopted
in discussing American art of the period. Secondly, we may trace these
concepts’ afterlives and witness their renaissance that has occurred in 
the late 20th century, before our own eyes.
Th e initial discursive eradication of Lippard’s ideas, that took place
in the 1970s, seems to be indeed related to Porębski’s 1971 diagnosis that 
the friendship mode of poets’ criticism was replaced by the new, imper-
sonal expert mode. In 1976, Rosalind E. Krauss and Annette Michelson 
launched the infl uential magazine October, which was to imprint its mark 
on art history and criticism in the following decades. Th e critics grouped 
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around the magazine, who just like Lippard commented on the Ameri-
can art of the late 1960s and 1970s, such as Hal Foster or Krauss her-
self, held a very diff erent view not only on how the ongoing artistic pro-
cesses should be interpreted but also on what artistic discourse should 
look like. Th eir analyses, founded on French theory and poststructur-
alist thinking, were completely free from the personal tone adopted by 
Lippard and leaned heavily towards what Porębski described as the “ex-
pert mode.”5 In addition to that, systematically (Krauss 1973: 45–53) or 
not, they contributed to the rejection of Lippard’s proposed labels rooted
in the paradigm of friendship (Szymański 2015: 35–58); instead, even
if this may appear absurd in the light of the postmodern theory to which 
they subscribed, they seemed to gravitate towards the lonely perspective 
of Cartesian cogito.
Although there can be no doubt that diagnoses off ered by Krauss or 
Foster have become canonical and it is hard to envisage contemporary 
art history and criticism without them, the last couple of years indicate, 
I believe, a gradual departure from the “expert mode” championed by 
the October circles. Th is tendency coincides with the rekindled interest 
in Lippard’s legacy and increased critical attention off ered to the work 
of Eva Hesse (expressed, among others, by the recent publication of her 
Diaries). Th e return to Lippard’s concepts is clearly visible in recent stud-
ies of her work (Butler 2012) and exhibitions focused on reinterpreting
Lippard’s historical exhibitions and texts.6 It can also be traced in various
critical and artistic enterprises aimed at reinterpreting the legacy of the 
1960s and 1970s, heavily drawing on the once-rejected perspective of 
friendship and poets’ criticism. Th e 2014 exhibition entitled Converging 
Lines: Eva Hesse and Sol LeWitt and organised by the Blanton Museum 
in Austin, Texas, together with its accompanying catalogue, is a case in 
point. It was fully devoted to uncovering the relationship between two 
artists, who happened to be also close friends. Both of them were also
5 One should not ignore the fact that Rosalind Krauss was the student of Clement 
Greenberg – the critic who preached a formalist approach to art criticism and spoke 
against Harold Rosenberg, his major adversary, who, in turn, supported a subjective, 
auto/biographical and existential mode of writing. Krauss’s contempt for the criticism 
of poets, which was still popular in the 1960s USA as testifi ed to by, for example, the 
work of Frank O’Hara, might be seen as a clear manifestation of Greenberg’s infl uence 
onto her critical practice. 
6 Such as the exhibition entitled Materializing “Six Years”: Lucy R. Lippard and the Emergence 
of Conceptual Art organised by the Brooklyn Museum in 2012/2013, and accompanied 
by a book by the same title (Morris and Bonin 2012).
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among the closest friends of Lucy Lippard, whose personal text was
featured in the catalogue.
Perhaps there is no point in announcing the end of a paradigm in art 
criticism which Porębski labelled as “expert mode” and replacing it with 
a new one, as paradigm shifts and turns in the humanities pronounced 
on an all but daily basis too often prove short-lived. What is signifi cant, 
however, and certainly proven true by the reception of Eva Hesse’s art 
and Lucy Lippard’s critical work, is that today’s interest in biography and 
aff ect studies facilitates the return of art criticism fi ltered through the 
perspective of friendship. And the old motto on friendship and truth by 
Friedrich Schiller, which once anticipated the Romanticism, can no longer 
be treated as sentimental debris: “Wahrheit suchen wir beide” (Schiller 
[in:] Prokopiuk and Siemek 1974: 5).
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